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ESSAY
TIME PASSAGE AND THE ECONOMICS OF
COMING TO THE NUISANCE:
REASSESSING THE COASEAN
PERSPECTIVE*
Roy E. CORDATO**
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of coming to the nuisance, or "first come first
serve," in tort law suggests that the time sequence of events
should be considered when making judgments in nuisance cases,
i.e., cases involving harmful external effects. In the classic exam-
ple of a railroad casting off sparks and setting fire to crops grow-
ing on adjacent farmland, a strict adherence to the doctrine
suggests that if the railroad was there first, i.e., prior to the plant-
ing of crops by the farmer, then its owners should not be liable to
the farmer for damages. In such circumstances, the plaintiff, in
this case the farmer, has "come to the nuisance."
The arguments both for and against invoking the criteria
when considering defenses in nuisance cases have been made on
fairness and economic efficiency grounds. This paper reexamines
the efficiency arguments that are made regarding coming to the
nuisance and argues that the entire discussion has been cast in an
inappropriate analytical framework. A problem that by definition
involves the passage of time has been forced-fit into a static equi-
librium framework of analysis. It will be argued that time pas-
* Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 1993 Eastern Economic
Association Meetings in Washington, D.C. and the 1996 Austrian Scholars
Conference in Auburn. Al. The author would like to thank Dr. Donald
Boudreaux, and Professors E.C. Pasour, and John Moorhouse for some helpful
comments on these earlier drafts.
** Dr. Roy E. Cordato is Lundy Professor of Business Philosophy at
Campbell University.
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sage automatically implies that the standard cost/benefit
approach, an application and extension of Coase's classic 1960
article "The Problem of Social Cost,"' is inappropriate to this
issue2 and leads to the asking of fundamentally unanswerable
questions.
A non-cost/benefit based alternative framework is offered
which focuses on the efficiency of market activities as they unfold
through time, rather than on static allocative effects. This alter-
native perspective is rooted in the works of F.A. Hayek 3 and other
economists of the Austrian school4 and gives rise to a unique set of
conclusions with regards to the efficiency properties of first come
first serve.
II. THE VIEW FROM COASEAN ANALYSIS
The most extensive and coherent discussion of the economics
of coming to the nuisance was done by Donald Wittman. Wittman
describes his task as follows:
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, J.L. & ECON., Vol. 3
(October) (1960).
2. See Roy E. Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of
Harmful Effects, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 229 (1989); CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN-ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1992); Cordato, Knowledge Problems and the Problem of Social
Costs, 14 THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 209, (1992). All
three of these references elaborate much more generally and fully on criticisms of
Coase's analysis discussed in this paper.
3. F.A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974. Much of his work
focuses on the role of the price system in disseminating information to market
participants. It is this analysis of Hayek's that forms the basis for much of the
analysis in this paper. See Cordato, Knowledge Problems and the Problem of
Social Costs, supra note 2.
4. The term "Austrian school" refers to a tradition in economics that
developed first in the late 19th century and early 20th century in Vienna,
Austria, with the writings of its founder, Carl Menger and several of his
students. (See CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1981). The Austrian
school of economics focuses on the implications of subjective preferences and
expectations, imperfect knowledge, and the passage of time for understanding
economic behavior. The modern Austrian school has developed primarily in the
United States and to a lesser degree at the London School of Economics.
Twentieth Century Austrian school economists have included Ludwig von Mises,
F.A. Hayek, Murray Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner. (See KAREN VAUGHN,
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA (1994); see also CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN-ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2.
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It is first necessary to establish the proper sequence of inputs into
the productive process (including the production of negative exter-
nalities);5 one must consider who should have been first instead of
who was first .... Once the efficient sequence is determined, the
next step is to determine the liability rule or property rule that
promotes the efficient sequence. 6
The efficiency properties of a rule of coming to the nuisance as
a guide to resolving disputes in tort law have generally been con-
sidered in terms of a "Coasean" framework of analysis.7 In evalu-
ating guidelines for the implementation of tort law, the efficient or
social welfare maximizing rules are those that would maximize
the net social value of production, measured in terms of the pecu-
niary value of output. Within this context the criteria for evaluat-
ing coming to the nuisance described by Wittman, would be
appropriate. The efficiency question that should be considered by
a judge in evaluating a defense of coming to the nuisance is indeed
"who should have been there first." In other words, whose use of
the resource, the first or second user, would maximize the net
social value of output? The factual question of who was there first
only becomes relevant as a benchmark in determining whether
the actual sequence of events was indeed the efficient sequence.
Wittman's approach is readily recognized as an extension of
Coase's analysis to the area of coming to the nuisance. As Coase
argued, in efficiently resolving conflicting resource uses of the
kind that might give rise to a nuisance, what needs to be deter-
mined is the "arrangement of rights [that] may bring about a
greater value of production than any other."s In a clear applica-
tion of Coase's prescription to coming to the nuisance, Wittman
argues that "the determination of who should have the right
depends on the costs and benefits of the entire income stream, not
just those costs and benefits after the second party came."9 In this
setting, a defense of coming to the nuisance should be recognized
in cases where the defendant's use maximizes the income stream
associated with the exploitation of the resource under
consideration.
5. "Negative externality" is the term in economics for costs that are imposed
on third parties as a result of production or consumption processes. A typical
negative externality problem would be air pollution.
6. Donald Wittman, First Come First Serve: An Economic Analysis of
Coming to the Nuisance, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 557, 559 (1980).
7. COASE, supra note 1.
8. Id. at 16.
9. Wittman, supra note 6 at 558.
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A. An Economic Analysis of Pendoley v. Ferriera
Wittman illustrates the procedure with a 1963 case, Pendoley
v. Ferriera.10 While a defense of coming to the nuisance was not
part of this case, it does provide an effective scenario for an eco-
nomic analysis of the issue. Pendoley" involved a conflict
between an established pig farmer, in what was initially a rural
area, and members of a subsequently established residential com-
munity located nearby. The complaint regarded the smells associ-
ated with the pig farm.
Wittman assumes two locations, one of which is categorized
as "good" and the other as "bad." He then examines the use of
these locations by the residents and the farmer over two periods,
with the presence of the farmer on one of these locations in period
one and the arrival of the residents in period two.
From this Wittman derives four scenarios, exhausting the
possible efficient sequences of the use of "good" and "bad" land in
the two periods.12 The actual efficient scenario depends on
assumptions that are made regarding the relative magnitudes of
the farmer's profits and the residents' utility functions' 3 with
respect to the use of the good and bad land. Property and liability
rules are then examined to determine how the application of these
rules would promote the efficient sequence of events, i.e., the effi-
cient use of the two categories of land over the relevant time
frame.
B. Problems with Coasean Methodology
For our purposes there is no need to delve more deeply into
Wittman's analysis. The problem is with the Coasean methodol-
ogy and not this particular application. These problems are gen-
eral in that they plague much if not most of the analysis in law
10. Pendoley v. Ferriera, 187 N.E. 2d 142 (Mass. 1963).
11. Id.
12. "(1) The Polluter is on the good land for both periods and the pollutee is on
the bad land for period 2. (2) The polluter is on the good land for both periods
and the pollutee is on the good land for period 2. (3) The polluter is on the bad
land for both periods and the pollutee is on the good land for period 2. (4) The
polluter is on the good land for period 1 and on the bad land for period 2 and the
pollutee is on the good land for period 2." Wittman, supra note 6 at 560.
Wittman rules out scenarios involving the possibility of moving in the middle of
one of the time periods as always being less efficient.
13. A utility function is a mathematical representation of a person's
preferences. The assumption behind this kind of representation is that
individual preferences are objective, specifiable, and measurable.
[Vol. 20:273276
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and economics. They stem from fundamental methodological
assumptions that were made by Coase that have been inappropri-
ately carried forward into discussions of many real-world negative
externality problems. While Wittman poses a two period scenario,
his analysis is completely static in that it abstracts from all of the
economically relevant problems associated with the passage of
time. This is necessary if one insists on staying within the tradi-
tional Coasean framework of analysis, which assumes a state of
the world that is always in a perfectly competitive general equilib-
rium, i.e., that all observed prices are competitive prices. 4
Coase's methodology is inappropriate to the task at hand.
III. TIME PASSAGE, MARKET PROCESSES, AND GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
As soon as we permit time to elapse, we must permit knowledge to
change .... The state of knowledge of society cannot be the same
at two successive points of time, and time cannot elapse without
demand and supply shifting. The stream of knowledge produces
ever new disequilibrium situations, and entrepreneurs continually
manage to find new price-cost differences to exploit. 5
The essence of time passage is change; change in preferences,
change in technology, change in population, etc. The significance
of these changes for economics is that they are either the product
of, or they lead to, changes in human knowledge. Furthermore,
the process by which knowledge changes is an imperfect one of
trial and error, which itself, is time dependent. By implication,
then, at any point in time some actions will be taken that are
based on erroneous information. In other words, people will make
plans that are inconsistent with the goals that they are pursuing.
In a market setting, such actions are penalized with losses. These
losses provide incentives to discard erroneous information and
reassess and redesign plans in hopes that future activity will be
based on accurate information and be rewarded by profits. This is
an ongoing process of plan formulation and revision in light of new
information. Knowledge is never perfected. As problems are fixed
new ones are revealed by the continuous generation and flow of
new information.
14. COASE makes this assumption throughout the analysis in his classic 1960
article, see Coase, supra note 1.
15. LUDWIG LACHMANN, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics, 126-
132 (EDWIN G. DOLAN, ed., THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
1976).
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This is the nature of economic activity as it proceeds through
time. It is a process that is never in general equilibrium. Further-
more, from the perspective of market participants, it is a never
ending, open ended process. The economic assessment of any time
dependent phenomena needs to make this process the central
focus of its analysis. To abstract from the process by assuming
that the world is in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium or
that the state of knowledge is "perfect" or simply "given" is to
move to a level of abstraction that bears little resemblance to the
real world which, consequently, yields non-operational conclu-
sions with respect to public policy.
This is why Coasean analysis is fundamentally inappropriate
to the task of assessing the efficiency properties of coming to the
nuisance. The cost-benefit approach derived from Coase's work
only becomes intelligible as a guide to rule making within the con-
text of a static, competitive equilibrium. Once the analyst steps
out of this framework and into the world of imperfect knowledge
that serious consideration of time passage implies, much of what
Coase's analysis, and by implication Wittman's analysis, pre-
ordains must be done cannot be done.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TIME PASSAGE AND OPEN-ENDEDNESS
FOR SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The use of social cost-benefit analysis as an analytical tool is
contingent upon making the simplifying assumption that all mar-
kets, not just those under consideration, are in a perfectly compet-
itive general equilibrium (PCGE). While Wittman, and others
who discuss the economics of coming to the nuisance much less
extensively, do not make this assumption explicit, it is necessarily
implied.16
The PCGE assumption allows several key analytical stum-
bling blocks to be finessed. As Buchanan' 7 and others' have
sought to emphasize, opportunity costs and benefits are subjective
16. This is not unusual. As is typically the case, when such simplifying
assumptions are consistently made in a particular analytical framework, after a
period of time they simply become a part of the implicit background information.
Such assumptions tend to be made explicit only in text books in the field and in
the earlier, seminal articles. See COASE, supra note 1.
17. See JAMEs BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC
THEORY (1969).
18. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION (1966); Karen Vaughn, Does it
Matter that Costs are Subjective?, 46 SOUTHERN ECONOMICS JOURNAL (1980).
278 [Vol. 20:273
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and therefore unquantifiable. Both costs and benefits are con-
cepts rooted in individual satisfaction. Benefit is the satisfaction
received from the taking of a particular action while cost is the
satisfaction foregone by choosing not to take other actions.
Strictly speaking, costs and benefits are intrapersonally per-
ceived. There is no interpersonal scale upon which they can be
unified and ranked and therefore they cannot be interpersonally
aggregated. There is no economically meaningful way to talk
about costs and benefits to society, apart from the individuals who
experience them. Yet all social cost benefit analysis, by definition,
makes this abstraction.
To get around this problem, economists typically assume that
all markets are in a PCGE. In such a setting, prices equate both
marginal social cost and marginal social benefit and therefore can
be invoked as a means of making objective the non-objective and
measuring the unmeasurable. But this assumption, invoked in
abstract analysis, does not change the nature of real world costs
and benefits. Since an efficiency analysis of coming to the nui-
sance involves the assessment of behavior through time, the possi-
bility that we are dealing with a general equilibrium world should
be ruled out. Furthermore, even from the perspective of static
analysis, the assumption that there is a nuisance problem in the
first place, i.e., an externality problem, is by definition an assump-
tion that a competitive equilibrium is not being obtained. There-
fore, to assume a PCGE, a world that is free of externality
problems, poses an internal contradiction in the theory.
The answer to "who should have been their first," in terms of
social costs and benefits, can only be arrived at if interpersonal
cost-benefit comparisons can legitimately, i.e., scientifically, be
made. As Wittman noted, "the efficient sequence cannot be estab-
lished without assigning relative magnitudes to profit and utility
functions."19 The assumption is that utility functions can indeed
be specified and aggregated and furthermore that it is scientifi-
cally meaningful to make comparisons between utility functions
and profit functions. But utility functions, in principle, cannot be
specified. Furthermore, profit functions can only be specified in
terms of accounting costs and not utility based opportunity costs.
In reality no meaningful comparison between profit and utility
functions is possible.
19. Wittman, supra note 6 at 560.
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If the PCGE assumption is not made then a host of new
problems arise for both the economic analyst and any policy
maker attempting to implement the efficiency enhancing solution.
In order to ascertain a property rights or liability rule that would
facilitate the efficient sequence of events, the relevant PCGE
would first have to be identified. From the perspective of social
costs-benefit analysis the efficient solution is the one that would
occur in a competitive general equilibrium. Coase's efficiency cri-
teria is only intelligible within this context.2 ° Consequently, in
evaluating coming to the nuisance the sequence of events that
would arise under conditions of competitive general equilibrium
must be known. In reality though, empirical identification of such
an equilibrium is impossible for even a point in time. Once it is
made clear that a judge or jury considering a defense of coming to
the nuisance is attempting to determine the efficient allocation of
resources through time, the PCGE efficiency benchmark loses its
relevancy even as a conceptual guide.
The analytical issue centers around what has come to be
called "the knowledge problem," which is the central theme of F.A.
Hayek's theoretical case21 against the possibility of efficient
resource utilization under central planning.22 In order to identify
a PCGE for a point in time one must have access to information
that is fundamentally unobtainable. This includes utility func-
tions for all market participants together with complete knowl-
edge of all resource scarcities and production functions, including
the economic significance of all technologies. This information
must be known for the economic system as a whole. Clearly this
task is beyond human capabilities, if not comprehension.
To complicate matters, when dealing with events taking place
through time, an analyst trying to construct an equilibrium solu-
tion is faced with a moving target. Even if a PCGE could be iden-
tified for a point in time, its relevance would only be historical. As
indicated by Lachmann's observations, continuous changes in
20. See CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN-
ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2 at Ch. 5.
21. The implications of the knowledge problem for Coasean type analysis in
law and economics have been extensively analyzed in Cordato, Knowledge
Problems and the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2.
22. See F.A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation I: The Nature and History of the
Problem, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 119; Socialist Calculation II:
The State of the Debate, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 148; Socialist
Calculation III: The Competitive Solution, in INDiIvDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 181 (1972).
280 [Vol. 20:273
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knowledge, i.e., preferences, scarcities, technologies, etc., dislodge
the relevance of any particular general equilibrium from moment
to moment.
With regards to coming to the nuisance, if one could deter-
mine who "should have been there first" in light of the relevant
data, i.e., utility and profit functions, for the beginning of time
period one, there is no justification for concluding that the data
and therefore the solution will not change by the beginning or the
end of time period two. In fact, the most reasonable assumption to
make is that it will change. It will be argued below that it must in
order for the nuisance problem even to arise.
V. TIME PASSAGE AND EFFICIENCY
When considering a time dependent issue such as coming to
the nuisance, efficiency analysis based on the normative bench-
mark of a PCGE is not useful. To assume that observed market
prices are competitive equilibrium prices as a means of circum-
venting the problems associated with subjective costs and benefits
is to make an assumption that cannot be true. In fact, to do so is
to assume away the most fundamental efficiency problem associ-
ated with the passage of time, namely how best to deal with
changing circumstances in a world of imperfect information. Fur-
thermore, to try and construct the competitive equilibrium solu-
tion from empirical data is also a futile and ultimately an
inappropriate undertaking.
A. Efficiency Problems in Time Dependent Settings
In a time dependent setting the efficiency problem facing mar-
ket participants is not simply one of allocating resources to their
highest valued use with all the relevant knowledge given. First,
from the individual's perspective, efficiency relates to the accom-
plishment of one's goals under conditions where the relevant
information can never be known completely and, furthermore,
where the state of that information is changing. The passage of
time implies the addition of information that did not previously
exist and the discarding of information that has become irrele-
vant. As noted earlier, this leads to a market process that is char-
acterized by trial and error, with activities based on both accurate
and erroneous perceptions being brought to light by the system of
profit and loss. This process is generated by the experiences of all
market participants-consumers, entrepreneurs, workers, pig
farmers, and home builders.
9
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Given the nature of this process, "efficient" outcomes of the
type that are typically pursued in the law and economics litera-
ture cannot be identified. Since aggregation of costs and benefits
across individuals is not conceptually possible, people's individu-
ally determined goals must be taken as given when assessing
social welfare. Social cost benefit analysis as a judicial decision
making tool is an attempt to decide whose goals are relatively
more important to society. But the concepts of social costs and
social benefits, as typically invoked, are, from the perspective of
economic analysis, neither operational nor conceptually meaning-
ful. Therefore, efficiency must be construed strictly in terms of the
welfare of individual members of society, as they, and not some
outside observer, perceive it.
B. Social Efficiency
The relevant question for "social efficiency" is what institu-
tional setting would best allow individual market participants to
discover, assimilate, and act on accurate information that will be
useful in the accomplishment of their goals. As this author2 3 and
others24 have argued, this requires a legal environment where
individuals are allowed the widest possible latitude for pursuing
their own interests while not being allowed to violate the similar
rights of others.
Maximum possible social efficiency, in this regard, requires
that individuals have exclusive rights to resources and the fruits
of their labor. The pursuit of goals and the formulation of plans
cannot proceed without access to the physical means necessary for
this process to take place. The implication, first, is that property
titles need to be clearly defined and strictly enforced. In such a
setting, conflict over the use of resources by two or more individu-
als with inconsistent plans with respect to the same resource, will
be minimized. Such conflicts are an important source of ineffi-
ciency and serve as the fundamental source of all negative exter-
nality problems.2 5
23. See CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN-
ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, Chs. 3 & 4.
24. See ISRAEL KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM, Ch. 2
(1963).
25. Id.
282 [Vol. 20:273
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C. Property Rights and Efficiency
In a general sense, from this normative perspective the con-
tent of property rights can be specified. The individual resource
owner should be allowed to utilize his property in any way he per-
ceives to be consistent with his own ends. This ensures that the
full force of people's preferences, perceptions of resource scarcities,
and knowledge will come to bear on the utilization of resources.
As a subset of this general principle, and particularly important to
the enhancement of market and therefore social efficiency, is the
right to contract and freely exchange property. This ensures not
only that people will be able to mutually pursue otherwise conflict-
ing plans through the exchange process, but it is also a necessary
condition for the price system to perform its information enhanc-
ing functions. In this setting where property rights are clearly
defined, strictly enforced, and freely exchangeable, relative prices
will capture as much information about preferences and relative
scarcities as possible, while weeding out erroneous information
through the system of profit and loss, i.e., trial and error.
1. Institutional stability requirement
An additional requirement, one that is particularly relevant
to the issue of coming to the nuisance, institutional stability,26
argues that a dynamic market process requires that rules defining
the scope of legitimate activity be stable. If efficiency, as dis-
cussed here, requires that individual market participants have
accurate information regarding the relationship of means to ends,
then a fundamental cause of inefficiency is error. Indeed, to
assume perfect knowledge is to assume away the entire efficiency
problem that individuals face in a time dependent setting. Uncer-
tainty with respect to property rights can be an important source
of error in the plan formulation process.
Again, this is an issue that arises because of the passage of
time. Plans are made and executed sequentially through time.
Plans that are made with respect to the use of resources of any
kind cannot be implemented unless one has the "right" to do so at
some point in the future. Uncertainty about what one's rights
may be with respect to the use of resources at different points in
the future, or false certainty in the face of future alterations of
26. See Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict
Liability, 9 J. LEGAL Stud. (1980).
11
Cordato: Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reasses
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
one's rights (and obligations), will generate errors and therefore
inefficiencies.
2. Certainty of legal rights
Furthermore, uncertainty with respect to legal rights and
obligations will have a negative impact on markets as a whole. In
a time dependent setting, expectations about the future are incor-
porated in relative price movements. In implementing plans,
market transactions are made which affect price movements. To
the extent that exchanges are made based on erroneous expecta-
tions, relative prices will reflect inaccurate information, sending
false signals to other market participants. False price signals can
facilitate the formulation of inefficient plans in a far flung and
unpredictable manner.
Since market processes take place through time, it is neces-
sary to consider the impact of institutional instability on economic
efficiency. Economic analysis of coming to the nuisance has disre-
garded this entire issue by assuming a world devoid of any of the
characteristics of real time passage. Because of this, rules that
appear to be efficient within the traditional static framework
could generate a great deal of inefficiency when imperfect knowl-
edge and institutional uncertainties are considered.
3. Predictability for efficiency in planning future activities
Wittman, for example, argues that the conclusions he reaches
regarding allocati've efficiency also have efficiency enhancing
incentive effects with regards to planning future activities. In a
footnote he points out that "the court case is more important in its
precedent-setting effects than in the effect on this particular set of
actors."27 He claims that implementation of the efficient rule "can
serve as a useful guide for the future." Concluding that:
cost-benefit calculations in . . . legal rulings . . . will encourage
those who come first to predict the probable uses of the land in the
future. If the most efficient alternative is for the farmer to use the
inferior land from the beginning, the farmer will in fact make this
choice if he can reasonably predict the future uses of the land.2"
This analysis calls on potential first users to have prospective
information regarding relative utility and profit functions con-
cerning people they do not know and situations that have yet to
27. Wittman, supra note 6, at 561.
28. Id. at 562.
284 [Vol. 20:273
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occur. From this information they are to draw conclusions about
the efficient allocation of resources. As we have argued, all this is
conceptually unknowable even retrospectively. Furthermore the
first user is called upon to have probabilistic information regard-
ing "future uses of the land" by people other than himself which
must be based on unknowable information about the efficient allo-
cation of resources.
This prescription calls on the first user of a resource to play
"central planner" with respect to not only the area that he is occu-
pying directly but all of the relevant surrounding resources. Since
the first user of a resource cannot possibly know the most produc-
tive pattern of resource use over time he is simply being asked to
make guesses about what the cost-benefit analysis invoked by
some future court might conclude regarding a yet-to-materialize
externality problem. Neither the first user nor the future court
could objectively determine the "efficient" resource allocation as
defined in the standard analysis. In reality, the entire scenario
simply calls for one person to guess what a future court will guess
at some unspecified point in the future.
Wittman's analysis rejects out-of-hand any of the information
problems discussed here. He asserts that, except for the level of
certainty (in a probabilistic sense), no distinction should be made
regarding ex ante and ex post knowledge. He states that it is a
"fallacy" to argue that "since the homeowners knew the pigsty was
there, they are the responsible party as they willingly accepted
the conditions of the sty when they initiated building."2 9 This is
because "the farmer knew (in a less certain way) that the home-
owners would want to build there. Therefore he is equally at
fault."30
In putting the burden of accomplishing what is fundamen-
tally an impossible task on first users of resources, a great deal of
additional uncertainty is introduced into the formulation of plans,
which detracts from efficient decision making. The probability
that the first user will make decisions that enhance allocative effi-
ciency, ex ante, would be decreased. The first user of a resource
would be more uncertain about his future rights and obligations.
This, in turn, would increase the probability that his expectations
regarding future resource utilization will be erroneous. Uncer-
tainty with regards to future rights must be considered when
29. Id.
30. Id.
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assessing the efficiency properties of coming to the nuisance. It
has been ignored because it does not exist in the traditional
Coasean framework of analysis.
VI. THE ROLE OF COMING TO THE NuISANCE
What would be the role of coming to the nuisance in this time
dependent setting where efficiency dictates that property rights be
stable, clearly defined, and provide for the widest possible range of
resource utilization by owners consistent with the same rights of
others?31 The question "who should have been there first?" is con-
ceptually flawed and non-operational.
Furthermore it requires that the analyst make comparative
value judgments between the conflicting ends of market partici-
pants. It does not take people's ends as given but suggests that we
must decide whose goals, in Wittman's example, the pig farmer's
or the home owners', are more important to society. As discussed,
cost-benefit analysis cannot be scientifically invoked as a criterion
for making this decision.
Ultimately, the assessment must be based on a question that
is not even recognized in most of the standard literature, namely,
who has title to the resources under dispute? This is consistent
with the conclusion reached above, that market efficiency in a
change laden, time dependent setting, requires that property
rights be clearly defined and strictly enforced. In this setting, not
only is it irrelevant to ask "who should have been there first" but it
is equally unhelpful to ask "who was there first." If we assume
that all property titles are clearly defined and had been through-
out the relevant time period, the question of who was there first
becomes muddy at best and possibly vacuous. This question only
becomes meaningful in the absence of clearly delineated property
titles.
A. Question of Ownership
With respect to the pig farmer in Wittman's example, we
assume that he initiated the farming activity on land that he had
legitimate title to, i.e., that he legally acquired (purchased, inher-
ited, etc.) from someone else. Over some period of time the farmer
31. Implicitly, this is the same question asked by Richard Epstein in his
article, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a Theory of Strict Liability, III J.
LEGAL STUD. 197-201 (1974). However his concern was one of corrective justice
and not economic efficiency.
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makes use of adjacent property (by allowing the spillover of odors)
that someone else has title to. For whatever reason, the owner of
the adjacent property did not mind that the farmer made use of
his property in this way and either implicitly or explicitly gave the
farmer his blessing.
Given this arrangement, it is simply not accurate to say that
the farmer was there first. The farmer was there with his smells
only because of the implicit or explicit permission of the owner. So
long as the adjacent property was owned by somebody when the
farm was built, it was the owner of the adjacent property who was
there first and continued to be there, making use of his property in
such a way that allowed the farmer to emit the pig odors onto it.
The plans of the adjacent property owner with respect to the use
of his property were consistent with the presence of the odors. He
felt no conflict with respect to the use of the resource during the
relevant time frame and therefore continued to allow the farmer
to enjoy what was essentially a windfall use of his property.
When Wittman's example is viewed as a sequence of activities
through time it is clear that plans that were made with respect to
the use of the adjacent property, by its owners, have changed. This
might be because the same owners simply have had a change in
their preferences or the market has changed in such a way that
the land became more valuable in alternative uses. Also, it may
be because new owners, who prefer alternative uses of the land,
have acquired the property.
In either scenario there is no efficiency case to be made in
support of allowing a defense of coming the nuisance in a tort
action that may be brought by the owners of the adjacent land.32
In the first instance, it would be difficult to argue that the farmer
was even there first. By assumption the adjacent land was owned
at the time that the pig farm was built and the smells started
leaking onto the adjacent property. The owner simply did not
mind if his neighbor, the farmer, made use of his property in that
particular way. There is no way to argue from an efficiency per-
spective that, having made that decision in the first place, he for-
feits the right to change his mind at future points as personal
preferences and external circumstances may warrant. To argue
32. Economic analysis of this scenario that takes into account the
implications of time passage leads to a conclusion also reached by Epstein. In
examining the ethical implications of this same issue, Epstein argued that "[t]he
enjoyment of a past windfall does not create the right to enjoy one in the future."
Id. at 198.
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otherwise is to make the specifically anti-efficiency argument that
markets and the price system should not be allowed to respond to
such changes and reallocate resources accordingly.
The second scenario is, in principle, the same. The original
owner, who didn't mind the smells from the pig farm, sells the
property to someone who, for whatever reason-possibly because
he plans to build a home or housing development on the prop-
erty-does mind. What has happened is that the relative value of
the property to the original owner has declined and he decides to
sell. Again, from an efficiency perspective, there has been some
change in circumstances and relative evaluations of the property.
The efficiency of the market process should be gauged by the
extent to which prices can accurately incorporate the new infor-
mation regarding these changes, reflected in the sale price of the
property. Furthermore, it seems safe to presume that when sell-
ing the property it was offered for sale publicly and that the
farmer had the right to put in his bid. In other words, he could
have secured his future rights to emit smells onto the property by
outright purchase. Indeed, the farmer could have made offers at
any point prior to the property officially going on sale to secure
similar future rights. In a general sense, the efficiency of a mar-
ket process to incorporate information regarding preferences,
scarcities etc., depends on the extent to which resource owners are
allowed to bring their utility functions and perceptions of the
world to bear on decisions regarding the exchange of their prop-
erty. Restrictions on this right will impair the extent to which
prices can perform their knowledge communicating functions.
Ultimately, without this fundamental right there is no market
process.
Viewing the pig farmer-home owner example from this alter-
native perspective, reinforces earlier arguments regarding the
relationship of coming to the nuisance to dynamic disequilibrium
analysis. It should be clear that the reason a problem arises for
the farmer is that with the passage of time, something-prefer-
ences, resource scarcities, etc.-has changed. If there were no
change from the original set of circumstances, there would have
been no conflict to resolve.
It is the passage of time that instigates this change. Static,
general equilibrium analysis is, therefore, inherently inappropri-
ate to the problem at hand. To assume that there is a "given" cost-
benefit scenario at the beginning of "t," that remains constant to
the end of "t 2" is inconsistent with any conflict ever arising.
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B. Implications when Ownership is in Question
An efficiency justification can be made for considering a
defense of coming to the nuisance when, unlike the previous sce-
nario, title to the resource involved in the dispute is unclear or
when the resource has been previously unowned. In this instance,
one of the criteria for an efficiently functioning market process is
not present. That is, property rights are not clearly defined. The
question then is who should have the right to use a previously
unowned resource. If the time sequence of use is detectable then
it can be argued that an allocation of rights based on first use, if
consistently applied, would enhance market efficiency.
1. The first use rule
In the example, as unlikely as this scenario would be in mod-
em times, let's assume that the farmer built his pig farm on prop-
erty that was adjacent to unowned, virgin wilderness, possibly in
the 19th Century when parts of the country were still being home-
steaded. At some future point, new arrivals stake a claim on the
adjacent property and begin to build houses. As part of this the
new arrivals claim that the smells from the pig farm are a nui-
sance and ask for either an injunction or damages from the
farmer.
In this case it is clear who arrived first in time. Furthermore,
if generally invoked as a well understood and consistently applied
rule, application of the "first use" principle would enhance efficient
plan formulation and the overall efficiency of markets and the
price system. First, such a rule would remove a great deal of
uncertainty and therefore reduce error in the formulation and exe-
cution of individual plans. In the example at hand, the pig
farmer, by being first to "use" the adjacent property, can be confi-
dent that his continued right to do so for the established purpose
(emit odors) will be upheld in the face of future nuisance claims.
This will increase the probability that his perceptions of the future
are accurate and that plans that are currently being made will
ultimately be fulfilled.
Such a rule would send important signals to potential comers
to a nuisance. In the example, those considering making use of
the adjoining property would do so in full knowledge that the
farmer has preceded them and, as such, has certain rights with
respect to its use. This knowledge, and the certainty about future
rights and obligations that it would generate, would be factored
into any decisions that are made with respect to the use of the
17
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adjacent land, ex ante. Anyone planning to build a house on the
land would do so in full knowledge that they would either have to
put up with the odors from the pig farm, incur the costs of insulat-
ing themselves from the odors, or negotiate a "Coasean" type bar-
gain with the farmer.
With regard to the price system and market efficiency, all of
this information regarding the farmer's property rights and obli-
gations, and the rights associated with the use of the adjacent
land would tend to be accurately reflected in relative prices. Any
transactions that are part of plans made for future use of the adja-
cent land would be based on expectations of returns that incorpo-
rate the farmer's right to emit odors from the farm onto the land.
For example, if someone planned to lay claim to this previ-
ously unowned land and build homes on it with the expectation of
selling these homes to future residents of the area, his expecta-
tions about the potential market price of those homes would prob-
ably include some discount for the odors. This discount would be
included in the price he is willing to pay for labor, construction
materials, etc. In this manner, the certainty that is generated by
a consistently applied first use rule would enhance the efficiency
and orderliness of the entire market process. Furthermore, such a
rule would reduce the extent to which nuisance suits in such cases
are even brought. In the example, with the knowledge that the
farmer would probably win in court based on a defense of coming
to the nuisance, it is more likely that the housing developer or
home owners would never file suit.
2. Modern applicability of the first use rule
As already noted, the scenario presented in this example is
not a likely one, given that nearly all land is owned by someone
and the days of homesteading land are long over. On the other
hand, this analysis does suggest that if a case similar to the pig
farm example were to arise, even within a context where titles to
property seem to be clear, it would be important to investigate the
history of those title claims before dismissing a defense of coming
to the nuisance. For example, if the pig farm, or maybe another
kind of farm that emitted foul odors, was established 125 years
ago and the adjacent land was homesteaded and titles began
changing hands 100 years ago, a defense of coming to the nuisance
might indeed be appropriate. Beyond this example, the analysis
suggested here could have other modern applications. For exam-
ple, conflicts regarding users of rivers, streams, or the air, where
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rights to the these resources have not been clearly defined, could
possibly be resolved based on a principle of first use.
The point to be emphasized here is that from the perspective
of a time dependent market process, the only setting where a
defense of coming to the nuisance will have efficiency enhancing
attributes is where titles to property have not been previously
established. In such cases, if applied as a general rule it would
reduce uncertainty in both individual plan formulation and in
market-oriented entrepreneurial activities.
VII. CONCLUSION
The efficiency properties of "coming to the nuisance" are intri-
cately tied to the economic analysis of disequilibrium market
processes as they unfold through time.3 3 In light of this, it is clear
that the perspective from which the issue has traditionally been
analyzed is inappropriate. Social cost-benefit analysis cannot be
meaningfully applied in a world where no general equilibrium
solution can be identified, where knowledge is imperfect and
errors are made, and where information is in a continuous state of
flux. Yet, this is the context in which coming the nuisance should
be assessed. Standard analysis examines an issue that is depen-
dent on the time sequence of events and assumes away the essen-
tial characteristics of time passage.
As many economists who have sought to emphasize the pas-
sage of time in their analysis have argued, 34 the efficiency prob-
lem facing both the individual and society in this setting is a
"knowledge problem." As Hayek suggested:
the economic problem of society is ... how to secure the best use of
resources known to any members of society, for ends whose rela-
tive importance only these individuals know.... It is a problem of
the utilization of knowledge that is not given to anyone in its
totality.3
5
Where the "relative importance of ends" cannot be known by
any outside observer, cost benefit analysis, when examining a con-
flict over the use of resources, has no role. The answer to who
should have been there first, when the normative standard refers
33. See GERLAND O'DRISCOLL & MARIO Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND
IGNORANCE (1985) (overview of perspective on economic analysis).
34. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1972); GERLAND O'DRISCOLL & MARIO Rizzo, supra note 31;
ISRAEL KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM, Ch. 4 (1963).
35. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 32, at 77-78.
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to the sequence of events "that may bring about a greater value of
production than any other, "36 is unknowable.
Efficiency analysis in this setting should focus on the overall
institutional setting that governs the plan formulation process
which, in turn, impinges on the overall ability of the price system
to utilize and disseminate accurate information. As a general
principle, in this setting property rights should be clearly defined
and strictly enforced, but beyond this the nature of those rights
can also be specified. Efficiency from this perspective requires the
maximum possible freedom with respect to the use of one's prop-
erty in the plan formulation and implementation process. The
only restraint is that the individual not violate the same rights of
others.37
If this is the starting point for the economic analysis of com-
ing to the nuisance then a unique set of conclusions are reached
with regards to its efficient implementation. If all property titles
are clearly delineated and had been so throughout the time period
under consideration then there is no argument for allowing a
defense of coming to the nuisance. Indeed, in this setting it is not
clear as to what it means for one or the other party to claim that
they had "been there" first. The only time that a rule of coming to
the nuisance would be useful is when property titles are not
clearly delineated. As an example one might consider conflicts
over the use of "publicly owned" waterways such as rivers,
streams, or lakes.
The overall purpose of this article has been to assess the
traditional framework for analyzing the issue of coming to the nui-
sance and to suggest and draw out some conclusion of a possible
alternative approach. The fact is that this alternative analysis
has implications that run much wider than the analysis of coming
to the nuisance. All economic analysis of issues in tort law is
essentially analysis of events that happen through time. Further-
more, time elapses from the period over which the nuisance takes
place to the period over which a claim is brought and a judgment
is rendered. Given this, the appropriateness of static, general
equilibrium analysis for many other issues related to the econom-
ics of tort liability is questionable.
36. Coase, supra note 1, at 16.
37. See KiRZNER, supra note 22, at Ch. 2.
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